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explained by both problems arising on the EU and the Eastern 
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second major issue for most EaPs. All in all the “carrot” offered 
by the EU is a small one compared to the appetite of the 
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that in some cases this “delay” is greatly influenced by a third 
factor, namely the forced choice on foreign policy orientation 
for which Eastern partners seem to be either not ready or not 
dedicated enough. The next EU-EaP summit (Vilnius, 28-29 
November 2013) might become a milestone in this respect. 
The core of the problem roots in the EU “offer” of deep and 
comprehensive free trade agreements (DCFTAs) that 
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Introduction 
 
Slow progress within the EU Eastern Partnership (EaP) program and disappointment of 
all affected partners can be explained by both problems arising on the EU and the 
Eastern partners’ side. Besides recent economic difficulties, diverging member state 
interests and approaches including the “South versus East” problem,1 shared 
competencies between EU institutions, uncertainties of conditionality,2 problems on EU 
side include some major deficiencies like the lack of incentive of EU membership or the 
slow progress in the visa-free movement of people, the a second major issue for most 
EaPs. All in all the “carrot” offered by the EU is a small one compared to the appetite of 
the targeted countries. At the same time Eastern partners can also be blamed since 
most of them delay in “doing their homework” to transform their political, juridical or 
economic systems. The paper argues that in some cases this “delay”, that is the lack of 
real commitment to doing the homework, is greatly influenced by a third factor, namely 
the forced choice on foreign policy orientation for which Eastern partners seem to be 
either not ready or not dedicated enough. The next EU-EaP summit to be held in 
Vilnius on 28-29 November 2013 might become a milestone in this respect. The core of 
the problem roots in the EU “offer” of deep and comprehensive free trade agreements 
(DCFTAs) that institutionally exclude the possibility of the Eastern partner’s parallel 
economic integration towards East. The first-ever EU EaP Association Agreement 
including a DCFTA is expected to be signed in this summit with Ukraine. 
 
Eastern partners can be divided into two groups. The first includes those partners that 
declared their willingness to become members of the European Union: Ukraine, 
                                                 
Revised version of a paper presented at the Lisboan seminar on “The European Neighbourhood Policy 
and the Lisbon Treaty: What has changed?”, Rome, 22 March 2013. 
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1
 Visegrad countries and Sweden for instance are among major supporters of the Eastern partners, while 
France and other member states from the Southern Europe are more interested in the other direction of 
the ENP, that is in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Germany’s positions are of key importance. 
2
 Belarus is a good example where the EU has been hesitating or has had problems when trying to 
establish conditionality for the past few years. Here on the one hand the EU would like to send clear and 
definite messages to the recent authoritarian Belarusian leadership, on the other it does not wish to put 
punishment on the population. A second problematic country is Ukraine, where conditionality got impetus 
due to the negative turn in domestic political developments, but where even most recent “conditions” of the 
EU are not clear. According to the Council conclusions on Ukraine, of 10 December 2012, the EU is ready 
to sign the already initialled Association Agreement in case Ukrainian authorities “address the cases of 
politically motivated convictions...”, but the document does not mention the Julia Timoshenko case as a 
concrete condition. Relations with Azerbaijan also raise the problem of conditionality: the EU has been 
often blamed of being too tolerant with the country possessing huge energy sources in which the EU is 
interested. 
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Moldova and Georgia. These states have been expecting clear signs, reflecting worthy 
of their European choice from the EU. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and 
particularly the EaP, as the answer to these expectations on part of the EU is not 
convincing enough for them. Meanwhile, their domestic political landscapes have been 
changing as well. For instance, Ukraine has become a more reluctant or at least 
hesitating partner, while due to most recent domestic political events Moldovan 
commitment might become also uncertain in the future. Shifts in these two countries 
are important, since after the initial period when Ukraine was the pioneer country in the 
Eastern dimension of the ENP, for the past few years Moldova has been seen as the 
“best pupil in the class”, that is the most advanced in rapprochement to the EU. 
Definitely, now Georgia remains the most determined Eastern partner. Although 
members of the second group, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus, have less definite 
goals and they intend to establish close ties without any real commitment to the EU, 
the forced choice might be relevant even for some of them in the future. 
 
 
1. Eastern partners between the European Union and Russia 
 
After a short period of co-operative approach at the beginning of the 2000’s,3 the EU 
and Russia evidently got involved into a competition or even rivalry over their common 
post-Soviet neighbours with a most obvious struggle for Ukraine evolving for the past 
few years. In 2003 the EU launched the European Neighbourhood Policy followed by a 
more targeted program within the Eastern Partnership initiative in 2009. EaP offers 
“deep and comprehensive free trade agreements” (DCFTAs) as a core economic 
element of the planned Association Agreements.4 On its side, Russia also initiated an 
ambitious integration project in the post-Soviet space, namely the Customs Union (CU) 
within the Eurasian Economic Community in 2010 now called as “Single Economic 
Space” (SES), and with the final goal of creating an Eurasian Economic Union. 
 
Both “offers” have their severe economic consequences making the choice for the 
EaPs hard. The necessity of the choice is due to the fact that the Russia-led CU/SES 
goes beyond the level of a free trade regime which makes the two parallel 
rapprochements impossible for institutional reasons. However, while economic benefits 
of the DCFTAs with the EU might be expected mainly in the long run (like the positive 
changes of the economic structure, more keen market competition leading to increased 
competitiveness, economic growth and increased welfare etc.)5, the economic 
disadvantages of rejecting the Russian offer will arise immediately. 
                                                 
3
 In 2002 the EU and Russia jointly worked out a “White Book” on their economic co-operation with a 
possible extension of the results of bilateral co-operation such as the planned Common Economic Space 
to other post-Soviet states. Ivan Samson, Xavier Greffe (eds.), Common Economic Space: Prospects of 
Russia-EU Relations (RECEP White Book), Moscow, Russian-European Centre for Economic Policy 
(RECEP), 2002. 
4
 In fact, it is not possible to conclude the Association Agreement (AA) on political co-operation without 
signing the DCFTA and DCFTA cannot be applied without a signed AA, which is a major hampering factor 
in the whole process in both cases: either in a case when a country is politically determined (Georgia) or 
when it is ready for deeper economic co-operation but political conditions are still not satisfactory (the case 
of the finalised DCFTA of Ukraine). 
5
 Long-term economic benefits have been predicted in several impact assessments studies made by up till 
now either for Ukraine or Georgia. See for example: Michael Emerson (ed.), The Prospect of Deep Free 
Trade between the European Union and Ukraine, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 
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The European Union is not ready to offer the membership perspective to the Eastern 
partners in the foreseeable future and seems to be rather reluctant in providing visa 
free regime for them as well. Visa free movement has been linked to very strict, mainly 
technical conditions.6 Reluctance on the EU part concerning the free movement of 
citizens of EaPs might turn to be a bad policy in this competition as well. Despite the 
strong pressure from some EaPs for visa-free movement of their citizens to the EU, 
visa free regimes can be expected only in the long term.7 At the same time citizens of 
most post-Soviet countries can enter Russia without visa, with Georgia being the only 
EaP for which visa is needed. Georgia is not only the most distant post-Soviet partner 
regarding new post-Soviet integration projects, but belongs to the small group of two 
post-Soviet countries outside the CIS as well.8 The visa regime introduced by Russia 
towards Georgia well illustrates its differentiated and presumably differentiating policy 
approach towards certain post-Soviet countries in the future. 
 
Eastern partners face a challenging integration/orientation dilemma. Most of them still 
have very close ties to other post-Soviet economies, mostly to Russia, in several cases 
and sectors even with strong dependencies, while they are in the process of 
developing privileged economic links with the EU as well. Now they are or in the future 
they will be forced to choose between integration course to the West or East, between 
Russia or the EU, since in the EU approach integration to the EU Single Market 
excludes economic integration into other integration groups at the same time for 
institutional reasons.9 While this choice, often considered to be a political one, does not 
seem to be a problem for some EaPs (like Georgia), it creates difficulties for others (at 
the time being the hottest for Ukraine) with serious short, medium or long term 
economic consequences. 
 
The EU is a key economic partner for the European post-Soviet countries. The 
economic interests of the EU are most manifest regarding the energy sources of the 
post-Soviet region, although developing trade and investment opportunities are also on 
the agenda. The European Union is already a major trade partner for four of the 
                                                                                                                                               
2006, http://www.ceps.be/node/1164; Merab Kakulia, Georgia: Eastern partners experiences and 
expectations with DCFTA, Presentation at the international workshop “Developing trade and trade policy 
relations with the European Union: Experience of V4 countries and implications/lessons for EaPs”, 
Budapest, 24 May 2013, http://vki.hu/v4_eaps_developing_trade. However, interestingly there are 
Ukrainian estimations, according to which Ukraine will not benefit from the DCFTA at all. One of them was 
made by the Institute for Economics and Forecasting of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences. See 
Volodymyr Sidenko, “Ukraine’s Regional Integration Policies: The EU versus the Eurasian Community”, in 
Zsuzsa Ludvig (ed.), Eurasian Challenges. Partnerships with Russia and Other Issues of the post-Soviet 
Area, Budapest, Institute of World Economics CERSHAS, 2013 (East European Studies No. 4), p. 11-29, 
http://real.mtak.hu/6808; Lidia Shynkaruk, Foreign economic relationships between Ukraine and the EU 
countries, Presentation at the international workshop “Developing trade and trade policy relations with the 
European Union: Experience of V4 countries and implications/lessons for EaPs”, Budapest, 24 May 2013, 
http://vki.hu/v4_eaps_developing_trade. 
6
 EU membership is a no. 1. priority for three countries (Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia), while visa free 
movement of citizens is key issue for all the six countries. 
7
 EaPs argue that the state of their technical preparedness and the general level of migration “threat” they 
represent is not really worse than it was in some Western Balkan countries that were exempted from EU 
visa regime during the past few years, pointing to the political character of the decision instead of the 
technical one emphasized by the EU. 
8
 Turkmenistan is the other one. 
9
 A major problem originates from the lack of WTO-membership of Belarus and Kazakhstan. 
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European post-Soviet economies, except for Ukraine and Belarus (based on figures for 
2010 and 2011). Here, Ukraine represents a major issue with its so-called “double ties” 
manifested also in foreign economic relations, a challenge which the country seemingly 
has not been able to address so far. Although the European Union is not ready to offer 
membership perspective to these affected countries, it intends to get these economies 
involved into its Single Market through its DCFTA idea. The idea is open to all EaP 
countries that are members of the WTO, that is Azerbaijan and Belarus, possessing 
only observer status in the organization, are at the moment out of the scope of the 
initiative. 
 
Russia still constitutes the economic centre of the post-Soviet space. On the one hand, 
it is the major partner or can be found among most important economic partners for 
most post-Soviet economies. Russia constitutes a major trade partner, an important 
investor and an attractive centre for labour migration in almost all cases. Besides, the 
“Russia issue” cannot be neglected in the sphere of energy, neither in the case of 
energy exporters nor for energy importers of the region. Transit aspects also largely 
matter. On the other hand, it has the ambition to be the centre for them evidenced by 
its integration plans and ideas, already in the process. However, Russian ambitions 
and plans for integrating the analyzed countries face competition on part of other 
regional powers, like the EU (or Turkey). Even so, Russian intentions to achieve 
economic integration with other countries of the post-Soviet space by creating an 
independent power centre have rarely been taken seriously by the West so far. The 
argumentation behind this neglecting approach has been basically linked to the failures 
of different post-Soviet or Russian-led integration initiatives, the phenomenon of 
“institutions on paper”, treaties with thousands of exceptions, up till now. We argue that 
these new Russian projects, namely the Single Economic Space (SES) based on the 
Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and the dreamed Eurasian 
Economic Union the core of which is the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) 
including Kirgizstan and Tajikistan beside the three above mentioned states, deserve a 
deeper attention, as they have taken concrete forms and constitute one of the main 
focuses of Russia’s current foreign policy. Economic factors and economic methods 
are getting to constitute a more and more important dimension of competition between 
countries and regional powers. Russia intends to build up or rebuild a Russia-led 
economic power centre in the Eurasian continent, particularly in the post-Soviet space, 
which is naturally a “political plan” at the same time. This ambition has become 
manifest during the last decade when Russia experienced considerable economic 
growth (especially in the years 2000-2008) and political stability which allowed it to 
focus on projecting its power in the “near abroad”. Russia has both attempted to 
develop close and strong political relations with the countries in the region, and 
formulated a concrete economic integration plan in its neighbourhood. A basic question 
is whether Russia will able to be a real and attractive gravity centre in its near abroad 
or not. Naturally the answer will be partly “yes” and partly “no”. Some post-Soviet 
countries (some EaPs) are likely to join or have already joined the Russian-led 
integration grouping, while others want to and may vote against this option. 
 
The common post-Soviet European neighbourhood is evidently a most important issue 
in recent EU-Russian dialogue. It is even more: one of the main hampering factors in 
EU-Russian rapprochement. No significant development in EU-Russia relations can be 
achieved without arriving at a compromise on this issue. Although the EU has been 
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emphasizing that the EaP is not an anti-Russian project, the EaP created deep 
tensions between the two partners. It received a rather chilly welcome from Russia who 
considered it as an initiative in conflict with its own ideas. Beyond the general political 
motivations for being a gravity centre for the region, energy and trade issues constitute 
the most evident fields of clashing interests between Russia and the EU.10 
 
 
2. The forced choice 
 
Tensions between Russia and the EU over Ukraine became public during 2011 
although they existed well before this year.11 Ukraine followed its well-known 
multivectoral policy during the nineties, and tried to keep it even after its euro-
integration priority had already been declared. ENP evidently targeted Ukraine as a no. 
1. country in 2003-2004 (in 2003 within the Wider Europe concept), but as a slight shift 
from a balanced multivectorism Ukraine joined the Russian initiated Common 
Economic Space involving Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan also in 2003, but 
leaving it soon after the orange revolution. Since these times Ukraine has been 
balancing between East and West, Russia and the EU, trying to collect benefits from 
both sides, but at moment the country is under high pressure to make a choice. 
 
The EU’s DCFTA plan has been most deeply elaborated in relation with Ukraine. The 
DCFTA is part of the EU-Ukrainian Association Agreement and is based on Ukrainian 
WTO membership and the declared Ukrainian commitment to the EU integration 
course. Although recent Ukrainian political leadership has been critical of the content of 
the DCFTA agreement basically negotiated under the previous Ukrainian government, 
negotiations were finalized at the end of 2011. The first ever EU DCFTA was initialled 
in Spring 2012, but its signing and ratification has been held up by domestic Ukrainian 
events, among others the imprisonment of the ex-prime minister, Yulia Timoshenko 
and the prosecution of other representatives of the opposition evidently on political 
ground. Although several conditions of the EU have already been met by Ukraine, the 
Timoshenko-case seems to be crucial point in the future of the Association Agreement. 
 
Meanwhile, Russian ideas on post-Soviet reintegration have been also developing and 
getting concrete forms. Three economies established the Customs Union, a formula 
very similar to the Common Economic Space (CES) initiative launched in 2003. 
Ukraine’s absence from the new organisation constitutes the difference between the 
two country groupings.12 However, beside the importance of bilateral Ukrainian-
Russian economic ties on the micro level, any post-Soviet integration grouping would 
need Ukraine, the second biggest and most advanced post-Soviet economy. Ukrainian 
                                                 
10
 Justin Vaïsse and Susi Dennison (eds.), European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2013, London, European 
Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), January 2013, p. 50, http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard/2013/russia/18. 
11
 See for example Zsuzsa Ludvig, “Integration Prospects for Ukraine: SES and/or ‘Deep Free Trade’ with 
the EU?”, in Gábor Fóti and Zsuzsa Ludvig (eds.), The Ukrainian Economy in Europe, Budapest, Institute 
of World Economics, 2007 (IWE HAS Working Papers No. 175), p. 42-45, http://vki.hu/workingpapers/wp-
175.pdf. 
12
 Ukraine participated in the CES at its starting phase, signed the basic agreement, but after the orange 
revolution the new Ukrainian leadership decided to leave the project, stating that Ukraine is interested only 
in a FTA level of the Russia-led integration. Both CES aimed and recent CU aims at a higher than FT 
stage of integration among members. 
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participation is evidently necessary to achieve the dream of a post-Soviet economic 
centre as an important pillar of the multipolar world. Moreover, the decisions of 
Ukraine, the largest and most influential country within the EaP, may have an impact 
on the course of other EaPs as well.13 This is why for the past few years Russia has 
been making pressure on Ukraine to join the CU. 
 
The EU argues that a potential Ukrainian membership in the Russian-Belarus-Kazakh 
Customs Union would not match with the planned EU-Ukrainian DCFTA and is 
definitely against Ukrainian WTO commitments. But Russia made it clear that without 
joining the Customs Union Ukrainian intentions to renegotiate principles of gas pricing, 
agreed under the Timoshenko-government, are only illusions. In exchange for the 
Ukrainian participation Russia offers not only cheap gas, but the elimination of export 
duties concerning its oil and oil products, providing compensation for potential 
Ukrainian payments due to WTO members’ claims and the elimination of safeguard 
measures introduced against several Ukrainian producers. Altogether according to 
Russian calculations the Russian offer totals to about 6.5-9 billion dollar a year.14 
Furthermore, keeping distance from the CU threatens Ukraine with facing new product 
wars, a widely used tool for the past years by Russia, and as a counter measure by 
Ukraine, as well. This is how Ukraine became the object of a double mill game.15 At the 
moment Ukraine is in an “either or” situation since none of its two major partners seem 
to seek compromise. Ukraine suggested having observer status in the CU, but it is not 
in Russian interests and plans to not have Ukraine fully. Although according to the 
basic document of the CU, in the long term Russia is thinking of a large Eurasian 
Economic Union linking the SES/CU to other states of the Eurasian continent in the 
longer run perhaps even with the EU,16 in the short run the competitive element of the 
Russian approach seems to be stronger than the co-operative one. At least the 
officially stated Russian vision on a future Pan-European common economic area is 
not in accord with its strongly negative reactions to the EU DCFTA plans.17 
 
Moldova and Armenia might also create tensions. Although, Moldovan economy with 
its small size and insignificance is not really crucial for any Russian plan, a definite 
Moldovan choice for the EU may lead to serious economic consequences in the 
                                                 
13
 Olga Shumyola-Tapiola, “Ukraine at the Crossroads: Between the EU DCFTA & Customs Union”, in 
Russie.Nei.Reports, No. 11 (April 2012), p. 20, http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=7104. 
14
 Ibid., p. 21. 
15
 On the significance of the CU Leonid Kozhara, head of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated 
the following on 8 May 2013: “No country can obviously change its geography. This means there is no 
other option for Ukraine but to strive to maintain good, neighborly and partnership relations with Russia. 
[…] Russia and the Custom Union as a whole are key trade partners of Ukraine. Should Ukraine not aim at 
the most favorable trade regime with the Custom Union? Of course it should.” See US Helsinki 
Commission hearing on “Ukraine’s Leadership of the OSCE”, Washington, 8 May 2013, 
http://www.csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContentRecords.ViewTranscript&ContentRecord_id=541. 
16
 The final aim of the Russian projects is to “proceed towards creating the Eurasian Economic Union with 
other countries, international economic blocs, and the European Union, with the attainment of common 
economic space”, that is Russian initiatives would make part of a broader integration process on the whole 
Euarasian space. Sidenko (2011) 
17
 Though not so evidently, Russia launched a similar competition in another “common neighborhood”, in 
the West-Balkans in 2011 when inviting Serbia and Montenegro, now both being EU candidates, to the 
Russia-led CU. 
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country. Russia would not welcome such a decision for political reasons.18 Though 
Armenia at the moment is further from achieving a DCFTA with the EU than Ukraine or 
Moldova are now, a potential Armenian-EU DCFTA would be also painful for Russia 
and could lead to difficulties in both EU-Russian bilateral relations and Armenian-
Russian relationship. Furthermore, although the country is not a formal member of the 
EurAsEC, neither of the Customs Union, it takes part in the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) and in some EurAsEC-operated entities as well, like the Anti-
Crisis Fund and Innovation Fund which indicate its interests in post-Soviet initiatives 
aimed at (partial) re-integration of post-Soviet economies.19 
 
Table 1. Relevance of the “forced choice” dilemma for the Eastern partners 
 
EU membership wanted, declared No EU membership 
but different benefits from the EU wanted 
 the existence of integration 
dilemma (+ or -) 
 the existence of integration 
dilemma (+ or -) 
Ukraine + 
Armenia 
- , but may turn: + 
Moldova - , but may turn: + Azerbaijan - 
Georgia - Belarus - 
 
For three countries the orientation dilemma does not exist, at least not in the 
foreseeable future. Georgia surely has not been a target country for new Russian post-
Soviet (re)integration intentions due to the political tensions between the two countries. 
On its side recently Georgia follows, probably, the most definite European course from 
among EaPs with full readiness to meet European expectations. Contrary to Georgia, 
Belarus’s path is just the opposite not only because without WTO-membership EU 
DCFTA offer is out of question, but for political reasons as well.20 From among EaPs 
Belarus is represented in all Russia-initiated post-Soviet integration groupings. The 
third country, Azerbaijan is in a favourable situation not being dependent neither on 
Russia, nor on the EU due to its endowment in natural resources, the EU and Russia 
                                                 
18
 Although according to Moldovan expert calculations the potential balance of benefits and costs of an 
eventual membership in the CU/SES would be negative mostly due to the high Russian/CU import tariff 
rates leading to price increase in the country, in a situation of a concrete Russian offer Moldova could 
easily face similar to thecurrent Ukrainian pressure. But evidently Transnistria constiutes the most 
sensitive issue. See Adrian Lupusor, Moldova’s experiences on developing trade and trade policy relations 
with the European Union, Presentation at the international workshop “Developing trade and trade policy 
relations with the European Union: Experience of V4 countries and implications/lessons for EaPs”, 
Budapest, 24 May 2013, http://vki.hu/v4_eaps_developing_trade. 
19
 Volodymyr Sidenko, The Customs Union and Common Economic Space of Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Russia as a new reality for the European Union and its Eastern Partners, Presentation at the international 
workshop “Russia between two worlds: achievements, failures of 20 years and prospects”, Budapest, 7-8 
April 2011. 
20
 However, a radical domestic political turn, not being likely right now, but cannot be excluded in the long 
run, would put the orientation dilemma on the agenda immediately. 
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are both interested in. Azerbaijan is most likely to follow its multipolar foreign (and 
foreign economic) policy in the foreseeable future.21 
 
 
3. Foreign economic relations in the mirror of statistics: EU versus Russia and 
the Customs Union 
 
When analysing the “in-between” situation of the Eastern partners and the 
attractiveness of the two gravity centres, concrete strength of foreign economic 
relations between the EU and EaPs on the one hand, and Russia and EaPs on the 
other should be taken into consideration as well. Trade, FDI and migration flows and 
tendencies are subjects to analysis in this chapter in order to evaluate the prospects 
and relevancies of economic integration initiatives with this or that partner. 
 
From among EaP economies Ukraine is the most interesting one since the EU and 
Russia are almost equally important economic partners of the country. Trade figures for 
the past few years have been very close to each other. Regarding FDI, both actors 
have considerable influence on the economy, while Ukrainian labour migration also 
intensively targets the EU, Russia (and Turkey!) as well. For Belarus, the EU and 
Russia are major economic partners at the moment, but taking into consideration all 
kinds of economic links and dependencies, Russia is the dominant one. Belarusian 
economy is evidently dependent on Russia in several aspects. For Moldova and 
Armenia the EU is by far the most important economic gravity centre; however, these 
countries also have strong links to the Russian economy in some sectors even with 
deep dependency on it. Georgia and Azerbaijan represent the two special cases. 
Economic relations between Georgia and Russia were almost entirely cut due to the 
political tensions that led to the 2008 August war, but this cut caused serious harms to 
the economy. Furthermore, Russian capital is still present in key companies and 
Georgian sectors. The Azerbaijani economy is the only one being not dependent on 
Russia. The country enjoys economic benefits of being important partner both for 
Russia and the EU. However, in the post-crisis period a new tendency has appeared 
with the rise of influence and significance of third countries like China or Turkey. On 
their side, post-Soviet countries under the pressure of the forced choice make also 
efforts to develop or strengthen third pillars of their set of economic links. Next 
subchapters provide more detailed information on recent state and trends in the 
development of these economic ties based on statistics. 
 
3.1. Trade 
 
International trade was hit strongly by the world economic crisis bottoming in 2009. 
2010 and 2011 already showed growing tendency world wide and across Europe as 
well. In these two years the EU was a major partner for Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia both in export and import side, while ranking first in Belarus exports also 
both in 2010 and 2011. Russia was the biggest export and import partner for Ukraine 
and ranked first in Belarusian imports during 2010-2011 with a share above 50%. 
                                                 
21
 Marius Mazziotti, Bastian Matteo Scianna and Djan Sauerborn, “Multipolarity is key: Assessing 
Azerbaijan’s foreign policy”, in CESD Working Papers, January 2013, 
http://cesd.az/new/2013/01/multipolarity-is-key-assessing-azerbaijans-foreign-policy. 
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Table 2. Ranking and share (%) of EU and Russia in EaPs exports and imports, 2010-
2011 
 
  2010  2011  
Moldova Exports 1. EU (47.5) 2. Russia (26.2) 1. EU (51.6) 2. Russia (20.8) 
 Imports 1. EU (44.4) 2. Russia (15.3) 1. EU (55.6) 3. Russia (8.8) 
Ukraine Exports 1. Russia (26.2)  2. EU (25.5) 1. Russia (28.9) 2. EU (26.5) 
 Imports 1. Russia (36.2) 2. EU (31.3) 1. Russia (35.4) 2. EU (31.2) 
Belarus* Exports 1. EU (43.8) 2. Russia (31.5) 1. EU (37.9) 2. Russia (35.1) 
 Imports 1. Russia (58.5) 2. EU (23.0) 1. Russia (54.7) 2. EU (19.0) 
Armenia Exports 1. EU (48.1) 2. Russia (15.4) 1. EU (45.5) 2. Russia (16.7) 
 Imports 1. EU (27.5) 2. Russia (22.3) 1. EU (28.3) 2. Russia (21.5) 
Azerbaijan Exports 1. EU (47.9) 7. Russia (3.7) 1. EU (59.4) 3. Russia (4.5) 
 Imports 1. EU (25.4) 2. Russia (17.4) 1. EU (32.4) 2. Russia (16.8) 
Georgia Exports 1. EU (18.3) 9. Russia (2.2) 1. EU (19.5) 18. Russia (0.5) 
 Imports 1. EU (28.4) 6. Russia (5.6) 1. EU (29.1) 36. Russia (0.1) 
 
* Data for Belarus are for 2009 instead of 2010. 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
To conclude, the EU is by far the most important trading partner of the Eastern 
partners, with a slightly growing significance for the region as a whole. However, in 
Ukraine, the key country within the EaP framework Russia is the number 1. trade 
partner, while Russia ranks first in the second biggest economy, in Belarus as well. As 
a new element Eastern partners have started to develop trade relations with third 
countries heavily and this has been leading to strengthening positions on part of China 
and Turkey in the first line, but others as well.22 These new tendencies can be linked 
both to intentions to reduce dependency on Russia and to EU internal economic 
problems. However, economic links with other than Russian post-Soviet economies are 
also strong and on rise among EaPs and with others like Kazakhstan, providing 
argumentation for thinking over joining new post-Soviet integrations.23 
 
It is worth having a closer look at Ukrainian figures of the past years in order to have a 
deep insight into the Ukrainian orientation dilemma. Since 2007 exports to the three 
countries of the CU have been exceeding exports to the EU27, while Russian shares 
alone have been higher than EU ones since 2010. On the import side 2009 was the 
turning point for the CU and 2010 for Russia to have higher shares as compared to the 
EU ones. 
 
                                                 
22
 In 2011 Turkey represented the third most important export destination for Moldova and Ukraine, while it 
was third in Armenian imports. China ranked 3. in Moldovan, Ukrainian, Belarusian and Georgian imports. 
Iran was the third export partner for Armenia according to Eurostat data base. 
23
 Ukraine was the second import partner for Moldova and the third for Belarus, while the latter ranked 2. in 
Georgian import list in 2011. Exports from Georgia to Kazakhstan, the second top export partner, totalled 
to almost 20% in 2011. 
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Figure 1. Ukrainian exports to the EU, the CU and Russia, 2005-2012 (billion USD) 
 
 
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine (http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua). 
 
 
Figure 2. Ukrainian imports from the EU, the CU and Russia, 2005-2012 (billion USD) 
 
 
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine (http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua). 
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3.2. FDI 
 
Although due to methodological reasons it is not possible to show the exact EU and 
Russian shares in total FDI stock of individual EaPs, some major outlines can be 
formulated. EU companies have invested much more capital into these economies than 
Russia for the past one-two decades, but the significance of the latter is also to be 
emphasized. 
 
According to official Russian statistics Belarus with 35.5 % share in total Russian OFDI 
stock in CIS, Ukraine (27%), Kazakhstan (12.7%) and Armenia (10.9%) are major 
recipient countries of Russian FDI, while in the statistics that tries to exclude the 
misleading phenomenon of “round-tripping” and “hidden Russian capital”,24, the leading 
position of Ukraine (38%) is evident. Under this calculations Ukraine is followed by 
Kazakhstan (25.3%), Belarus (15.6%) and Uzbekistan (6.8%).25 Although based on 
both statistics the first three countries are the same, the latter statistics highlight more 
the importance of Ukraine for the new post-Soviet, Russia-led integration groupings. 
Ukrainian-Russian economic links on company level are extremely strong. 
 
Table 3. Russian and EU FDI stock in Ukraine, as of 31 December 2012 
 
 Official 
Russian FDI 
(ORFDI) 
EU Cyprus 
(1. EU 
source) 
EU-Cyprus Germany 
(2. EU 
source) 
Real Russian FDI 
(RRFDI) 
ORFDI < RRFDI  
< Russia+Cyprus 
million USD 3785.8 42979.3 17275.1 25704.2 6317.0 3785.8<RRFDI<21060.9 
% in total 7.0 78.9 31.7 ... ... ...) 
 
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine (http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua). 
 
Although based on official statistics the EU is by far the most important source of FDI in 
Ukraine, Russia as a country investor must be among leading ones when excluding the 
consequences of the “round-tripping” and “hidden origin” phenomena, with Russian 
sum being perhaps close to the figure for Germany, the biggest EU investor. Although 
due to lack of exact information on Russian and Ukrainian shares in FDI coming from 
Cyprus one must be very careful with these calculations it is obvious that real sum for 
FDI stock of Russian origin in Ukraine is higher than the official figure indicates. Recent 
events in Cyprus might have a major influence on this picture but these impacts are 
hard to be evaluated at the time being. Presumably, Russian investors will chose other 
channels for hiding their real identities. This phenomenon affects other post-Soviet 
economies as well, but its extent is the biggest one regarding Ukraine. 
                                                 
24
 “Round-tripping” means that a certain part of statistically inward FDI is not of foreign origin in reality, but 
domestic capital instead, that left the country for different, mainly tax-avoiding reasons and comes back as 
foreign. “Hidden origin” in this case refers to capital of Russian origin coming to Ukraine, also as Cyprian. 
According to assumptions the Ukrainian part is the dominant one, but Russian share is also not negligible. 
25
 EDB Centre for Integration Studies, “Monitoring of Mutual Investments in the CIS”, in EDB Centre for 
Integration Studies Reports, No. 6 (October 2012), p. 8 and 31, 
http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/invest_monitoring. The statistical 
database built up and used by the authors’ is based on company level information instead of macro 
statistics. 
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Moreover, it is notable that newly launched post-Soviet Customs Union already now 
has strong positive impact on capital flows within its frames through the gradual 
introduction of national treatment. Regulations ease FDI flows from one member state 
to another even now.26 This trend is due to maintain. As a conclusion one may state 
that the balance of FDI is evidently for the EU, but the influence of Russian capital 
should not be underestimated, neither. 
 
3.3. Labour migration 
 
The largest EU economies like Germany, Italy or Spain are naturally most frequently 
chosen as target countries by post-Soviet labour migrants. According to a study made 
for the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Germany) most of post-Soviet 
migrants lived in Germany, Italy, the Czech Republic and Spain in 2010, with Ukraine, 
(Russia) and Moldova being the main countries of origin.27 As regards Ukraine, a major 
source of immigration, the number of persons with country of birth indicated “Ukraine” 
totalled to 191.9 thousand in Italy, 155.5 thousand in Poland, 116.4 thousand for the 
Czech Republic and 84.5 thousand in Spain in 2011, in all with a growth from 2010 
except for the Czech Republic based on Eurostat database. Although figures for 
migration from post-Soviet countries to the EU are rather high and according to 
calculations approximately 1.5 million migrants from the CIS lived in the EU in 2010, 
post-Soviet migration targeting Russia and other CIS economies is also considerable, 
with Russia and Kazakhstan being on first places as destination countries. 
 
Post-Soviet states still constitute the most important and even dominating sending 
country group for Russia. Based on figures of the 2010 census in Russia nearly 86% of 
all residents with foreign citizenship were citizens of any other post-Soviet state (see 
Table 4). Between 2000 and 2006 the top 10 sources were post-Soviet states 
(excluding only Turkmenistan out of the top list). CIS countries are also estimated to be 
the main source of irregular migration with these migrants in most cases belonging to 
the category of labour migration.28 For citizens of Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia or other 
countries Russia offers a better living. 
 
Contrary to the tendencies of the 1990’s when massive ethnic migration could be 
observed, 2000’s can be characterized by labour migration. The figures for labour 
migration have been increasing since mid 2000’s to the start of the economic crisis. 
According to the figures of Russian Federal Service on Migration, the number of labour 
migrants decreased from 2.43 million in 2008 to 1.64 million by 2010 from which 1.25 
                                                 
26
 As a result a massive Russian FDI outflow has been observed for the past 1-2 years from Russia to 
Kazakhstan mainly due to the fact that “doing business” rating of Kazakhstan (and even of Belarus) is 
much better than that of Russia. Svetlana Glinkina (ed.), Евразийский интеграционный проект: 
эффекты и проблемы реализации [Eurasian integration project: effects and issues of implementation], 
Moscow, RAS Institute of Economy, 2013, http://inecon.org/docs/Glinkina_Eurasia_2013.pdf. 
27
 Susanne Schmid, “Das Migrationspotenzial aus der GUS in die Europäische Union”, in Federal Office 
for Migration and Refugees Research Reports, No. 17 (March 2012), 
http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Publikationen/Forschungsberichte/fb17-migrationspotenzial-
gus.html?nn=1840754. 
28
 International Organization for Migration (IOM), Migration in the Russian Federation: A Country Profile 
2008, Geneva, IOM, 2009, http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/Russia_Profile2008.pdf. 
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million arrived from the CIS.29 This figure is very close to the figure of 1.5 million 
migrants from the CIS registered in the EU. From among EaPs Ukraine and Moldova 
belong to the biggest sending post-Soviet states. Remittances from work in Russia 
greatly contribute to the incomes of the sending countries and their population.30 Even 
in Georgia Russian share is about 65% of all remittances, the latter constituting 6% of 
the GDP based on figures for 2011. Russian share is about 80% in Azerbaijan.31 One 
should take into account that these two countries represent the most independent 
economies from the Russia from among EaPs. 
 
Table 4. Top nationalities of immigrants to Russia (2010) 
 
 Head Share of nationality in total 
foreign immigrants (%) 
Azerbaijan 67947 9.9 
Armenia 59351 8.6 
Belarus 27668 4.0 
Ukraine 93390 13.6 
Georgia 12077 1.8 
Moldova 33884 4.9 
EaP together 294317 42.8 
Post-Soviet together 590748 85.9 
Europe together (without post-Soviet) 16470 2.4 
China 28382 4.1 
Vietnam 11084 1.6 
Turkey 5400 0.8 
India 4489 0.7 
Persons with foreign citizenships together 686993 100.0 
 
Source: Results of census in Russia in 2010, Federal State Statistics Service 
 
As an impact of the world economic crisis the level of Russian unemployment grew 
significantly leading to a new Russian migration policy aimed at limiting the number of 
labour migrants. But Russian migration policy turned not only into tightening but 
differentiation as well. For those post-Soviet countries ready to participate in new post-
Soviet reintegration projects, mainly in the CU/SES not only recent visa-free regime, 
                                                 
29
 EDB Centre for Integration Studies, “Трудовая Миграция в ЕЭП” [Labour Migration in the CES], in EDB 
Centre for Integration Studies Reports, No. 3 (March 2012), p. 11, 
http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/labour_migration. 
30
 The more than 30% share of remittances in Tajikistan and Moldova compared to the GDP is the highest 
in the world. 
31
 Annamária Kiss, “Russia and the South Caucasus: Managing Contradictions”, in Zsuzsa Ludvig (ed.), 
Eurasian Challenges. Partnerships with Russia and Other Issues of the post-Soviet Area, Budapest, 
Institute of World Economics, 2013 (East European Studies No. 4), p. 57. and 63, http://real.mtak.hu/6808. 
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but even a united labour market without any restrictions will be provided. Others not 
joining this integration grouping and getting into conflict over it with Russia might face 
tough quotas and potentially even newly introduced visa regimes in the future raising 
the “price list” of non-membership. 
 
 
4. Being part of the EU single market: challenges of DCFTA 
 
According to the EU rhetoric the EU offer for integrating economies of the Eastern 
partners (i.e. those with WTO-memberships) into the Single Market is definitely a huge 
benefit for them. But seeing from the EaP side, this statement might raise questions. 
DCFTAs in fact represent a package of painful measures in the short and medium term 
while offering benefits (improving economic structure and competitiveness, welfare 
impacts etc.) mainly in the long term. Since the only DCFTA up till now is finalised with 
Ukraine, one may take the Ukrainian example to show its contradictions with both 
being “deep” and “comprehensive”. 
 
Firstly, in principle “comprehensive” means gradual or rapid liberalisation regarding all 
products on both EU and Ukrainian side. In practice, according to the finalised 
negotiations on EU-Ukrainian DCFTA, opening up occurred to be limited to the 
industrial production with rather small impact on the Ukrainian economy at least in 
short and medium term. The limited benefits are closely connected both to the 
unfavourable structure of Ukrainian industrial exports and the low level of EU average 
import tariff rate for non-agricultural products (4% in 2010), while the similar Ukrainian 
average import tariff rate was even lower (3.8%) in 2010. The limited expectable 
impacts are partly due to the already performed Ukrainian liberalisation within the 
WTO-accession process. What is more important, lagging behind in technological level 
and in the production of goods with high added value, Ukraine would be more 
interested in the opening up of the EU agrarian market, in which the negotiated DCFTA 
offers a very modest progress leading to disappointment on the Ukrainian side.32 
According to the calculations made in the Institute for Economics and Forecasting of 
the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine “all key items of Ukrainian agrarian and 
foodstuff exports (except sunflower seeds and rapeseed needed for bio energy) were 
practically excluded from the free trade regime, as free trade was granted for them only 
within minor tariff quotas set at the level sometimes less than 0.1% of the annual value 
of sales in the EU internal market. Outside these quotas, the EU has extremely high 
(actually prohibitive) import tariffs for many agrarian products and foodstuffs.”33 These 
facts are crucial for an economy facing serious difficulties since the outburst of world 
economic crisis, leading to the conclusion that the expected and promised long-term 
economic structural impacts are simply not motivating enough. 
 
Secondly, “deep” means not only classical opening up of markets but that a difficult 
process of legal approximation is expected to undertake causing potentially serious 
social costs. While Central East European EU candidates naturally undertook this 
burden, it is not so evident in the case of Eastern partners who are lacking the EU 
                                                 
32
 The EU argues that the limited offer regarding agricultural trade is due to the Common Agricultural 
Policy, which cannot be modified just for Ukraine. 
33
 For more details see Volodymyr Sidenko, “Ukraine’s Regional Integration Policies…”, cit. 
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membership perspective. In their cases it is a crucial question what degree of adoption 
of EU trade acquis is reasonable and who decides on it. According to an Ukrainian 
expert: “Ukraine ended up having rather limited influence, with the EU having a clear, 
non-negotiable list of commitments demanded [...]”.34 It is not surprising that this led to 
the already mentioned disappointment in Ukraine. We argue, that the EU should be 
more flexible in the DCFTA negotiation process in order to be attractive enough for its 
Eastern partners. Fortunately, according to Georgian expert view, Georgia made “a 
better job” or the EU drew the conclusions. Georgian negotiators managed to influence 
the process of approximation in order to protect its national interest to a higher extent.35 
 
 
Conclusions: Attractiveness of the EU versus Russia in the light of the three Ms 
(market, mobility and money) and conditionality 
 
Based on the analysis of trade flows between European post-Soviet states and Russia 
on the one hand, and with the EU on the other, we may draw the conclusion that 
although Russia still considers itself as the economic centre of the post-Soviet space, 
this role has been greatly challenged by the growing trade importance of the EU (and 
others like Turkey or China). Research on other kinds of economic ties such as FDI 
and labour migration may tincture this picture. While EU capital is dominating, Russia 
as a source of FDI is also considerable, however, not always so visible. Naturally, the 
picture is differentiated in individual country cases. Considering labour force 
movements from individual post-Soviet countries, the EU is a most reluctant partner, 
while Russia has recently launched a policy of differentiation with offering united labour 
market for some countries while formulating toughening limits to the others. Why are 
these facts important? 
 
Based on recent strength of economic links between individual EaPs and Russia, it is 
obvious, that although they have been weakened to a great extent since the 1990’s in 
several cases they are still strong enough to be a reasonable basis for joining Russia-
led post-Soviet integrations. Therefore, the forced choice might be painful. The EU 
should take into consideration this fact to a greater extent than it does. The carrot 
offered to the Eastern partners aimed at involving them both into the political 
association and the economic integration should be attractive enough and given in due 
time. Political conditionality, uncertainties of economic benefits of DCFTAs in short and 
medium term, reluctance to provide mobility to the citizens of EaPs and the lack of 
really motivating amount of EU financial support may lead to an unexpected result: 
pushing some of the Eastern partners to look for other integration schemes and 
partners. Russia is ready to grab the opportunity. The three “Ms” does not seem to 
function well. Moreover, other major international players (like Turkey, the regional 
power Turkey or even China, the global player) have their economic interests in the 
region as well, with their “offers” often being without (hard) “conditions”. For all the 
above reasons, the EU should be more pragmatic when formulating its Eastern 
Partnership policy, paying much more attention to the “Russia factor”. Otherwise it 
might be a loser due to its slowness, cautiousness and strict set of both political and 
economic conditions. 
                                                 
34
 Olga Shumyola-Tapiola, “Ukraine at the Crossroads…”, cit., p. 20. 
35
 Merab Kakulia, Georgia: Eastern partners experiences and expectations with DCFTA, cit. 
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